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ABSTRACT
The objective of the paper is to present the challenges posed by the post-
2015 international climate change regime to all countries in relation to 
mitigation measures to achieve the goal set in the Paris Agreement and 
to reflect on the contributions determined unilaterally by the countries, 
respecting their capacities and development needs and on the combined 
effect of reductions and removals of greenhouse gases, if sufficient to limit 
global warming by up to 2°C. Therefore, the work starts with a reflection on 
the Brazilian contribution to the new period and advances a brief analysis 
of the global context and the future of the regime. From the point of view 
of international regimes as governance actions, this paper briefly examines 
the climate change regime, highlighting the innovations introduced by the 
Paris Agreement. The method used to make the analysis of this study will 
be the analytical with support in theoretical research taking into account 
bibliographical and doctrinal surveys in relation to the international climate 
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change regime and to global governance. The article concludes that the 
environmental global governance promoted implementation and evolution 
of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities within the 
climate change regime. 
KEYWORDS: Paris agreement; climate change international regime; 
global governance of the environment. 
 
ACORDO DE PARIS: REFLEXÕES E DESAFIOS PARA O REGIME 
INTERNACIONAL DE MUDANÇAS CLIMÁTICAS
RESUMO
O objetivo do trabalho é apresentar os desafios que o regime internacional 
de mudanças climáticas pós-2015 traz a todos os países com relação 
às medidas de mitigação para atingir o objetivo definido no Acordo 
de Paris e fazer uma reflexão quanto às contribuições determinadas 
unilateralmente pelos países, respeitadas suas capacidades e necessidades 
de desenvolvimento e quanto ao efeito conjunto das reduções e remoções 
de gases de efeito estufa, se suficientes para limitar o aquecimento global 
em até 2º C. Para tanto, o trabalho inicia com uma reflexão sobre a 
contribuição brasileira ao novo período e avança numa breve análise do 
contexto mundial e do futuro do regime. Partindo da visão de regimes 
internacionais como ações de governança, o trabalho realiza breve exame 
do regime de mudanças climáticas com destaque para as inovações 
introduzidas pelo Acordo de Paris. O método utilizado para fazer a análise 
deste estudo será o analítico com suporte em pesquisa teórica, tomando-se 
por base levantamentos bibliográficos e doutrinários em relação ao regime 
internacional e à governança global. O artigo conclui que a governança 
global do meio ambiente promoveu aplicação e evolução do princípio das 
responsabilidades comuns, porém diferenciadas no regime internacional 
de mudanças climáticas. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: acordo de Paris; regime internacional de mudanças 
climáticas; governança global do meio ambiente. 
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INTRODUCTION
 
The international climate change regime, organized within the 
framework of the United Nations System for 24 years, is in essence a 
dynamic institutional arrangement of permanent construction created to 
facilitate understanding and promote cooperation among the 195 signatory 
countries, with its own Legal structure and organizational framework, which 
aims to stabilize1 the global climate system and contain global warming 
caused by greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, such as carbon dioxide from 
fossil fuel combustion and deforestation/degradation of forests due to the 
use of land for agricultural activities and by urban occupation. 
The realization of this unpostpable goal standardized in the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change interweaves the 
climate regime with global environmental governance as a mechanism for 
resolving conflicts and promoting the necessary cooperation among national 
states in a globalized, interdependent and complex world. Governance, as 
an instrument of expanded participation, with the involvement of state and 
non-state actors, based on consensus and persuasion for the elaboration of 
its self-regulation and anchored in a permanent institutional arrangement 
(CAMARGO, 2015), is the way forward to achieve this objective of 
climate stabilization in a timely manner. 
This has been the concern of some scholars and the tonic of many 
questions about the effectiveness of the climate change regime: would the 
international regime constituted by states, which until COP21 had been 
conservative and more clingy to the principle of sovereignty, to the point of 
restraining the very development of the climate regime, be able to conduct 
and induce the necessary actions (especially reductions in GHG emissions) 
in time to avoid a rupture of the global climate system?
At this point, Camargo’s closing words (2015, p. 92) apply well 
to the combat regime on climate change:
 
1 According to Article 2 of the Convention, promulgated by Decree 2. 652 of July 1, 1998,”The 
ultimate goal of this Convention and any related legal instruments adopted by the Conference of the 
Parties is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Convention, the stabilization 
of the concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference within the climate system. This level should be achieved within a time frame 
sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is 
not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner. “
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The effectiveness of the International Regimes as actions of global environmental 
governance depends on the will of the nation-state to give up some of its dogmas in 
order to achieve the common global interest, with full transparency in the monitoring 
of its conduct and the degree of resistance of the proposed mechanisms, adjusted 
within each nation-state. 
 
Under the climate change regime, the world can be seen in two 
blocs, one consisting of countries that are predominantly GHG emitters, 
usually industrialized, with developed or developing economies, that 
suffer less or less intensely the effects of climate change, and a second 
bloc, formed by countries that are feeling more of the effects of climate 
change than contributing to GHG emissions (FARIAS; REI, 2015, p. 119). 
What was the will of the States at COP-21? In terms of 
standardization, details of the obligations of each country, definition of 
quantified reduction targets, metrics for meeting the reduction targets, and 
the necessary financial contributions that developed countries will make to 
developing countries so that they can achieve their reduction targets and 
bring about the necessary adaptations to the current climate change, it can 
not be denied that the Paris Agreement brought a rush of hope to the regime. 
The international community has undertaken to limit the temperature rise 
below 2°C and to continue efforts to limit the temperature rise to 1,5°C 
(preamble). 
As a matter of fact, the objective of a maximum heating of 
2°C in relation to the pre-industrial era was defined in 2009 at the COP 
in Copenhagen, and it implies a drastic reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, with measures such as energy savings, greater investments in 
renewable energies and reforestation. 
Still at the COP in Copenhagen, developed countries pledged 
$100 billion a year from 2020 to help developing nations finance the 
transition to clean energy, as well as their adaptation to the effects of 
warming. As argued by developing countries, the paragraph 54 in the 
text of the Agreement states that the sum of $100 billion per year is only 
a “ceiling”, and that a new financial value will be set in 2025 (PARIS 
AGREEMENT, 2015, p. 8). 
If it is true that the context of the climate agenda suggested a 
tense situation before COP-21, which raised at least two questions, the first 
regarding the criterion of distribution of the responsibilities of the States in 
relation to the adoption of mitigation measures and the second to the real 
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capacity of multilateralism to make effective the mitigation and adaptation 
efforts (REI; CUNHA, 2015, p. 21), the Paris Agreement promoted a 
significant change of tone. 
As is well known, the climate regime is based on the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibility among countries, which aims to 
distribute, with fairness, the burden of obligations which each country must 
bear in mitigation actions, taking into account their historic contributions 
of GHG (and why not their current contributions?), their internal capacity 
to undertake mitigation and adaptation efforts and to assist other countries, 
without prejudice to their right of development. 
In this sense, it should be emphasized that the distribution of 
GHG emissions mitigation commitments among countries has been one 
of the main issues in the international negotiations on the climate regime 
(REI; CUNHA, 2015, p. 34). And it was increasingly clear that developing 
countries, specially China, India, Brazil and South Africa, would have to 
shoulder their responsibilities with emission reduction targets, not just 
Annex I to the Convention (including developed countries, Members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and Eastern European countries in transition to market economy). 2 In this 
sense, the Article 4 of the Agreement it is stipulated that the industrial 
countries should be at the forefront and set emission reduction targets in 
absolute terms, while developing countries should continue to increase 
their efforts in the fight against Global warming in the light of their national 
situation. 
The reflections, challenges and opportunities for the future of the 
climate change regime develop from these political, normative, economic 
and cultural constraints, as we can evaluate next. 
 
1 REFLECTIONS ON THE CONTRIBUTION FROM BRAZIL
 
In September 2015, in the countdown to COP-21, the then 
government of Dilma Rousseff announced its targets for reducing GHG 
emissions to lead to the long-awaited COP of the”turnaround” of the 
regime combat climate change. 
Brazil is committed to reducing GHG emissions by 43% with 
reference to 2005. The then President announces, among the mitigation 
2 Moreover, it should be noted that the United States has not signed the Kyoto Protocol since it has 
maintained a position that all countries of the Convention should commit to reduction targets, not just 
those in Annex I. 
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measures, that Brazil3 will achieve zero illegal deforestation by 2030 (pay 
attention she only mentions illegal deforestation) and will restore something 
around 12 million hectares, recover 15 million hectares of degraded 
pastures and integrate 5 million hectares of crop-livestock-forests. 
However, Brazil (through the Dilma Government) refused to 
sign the New York Declaration on Forests in September 2014, which had 
as one of its objectives zero deforestation in the world by 2030. It is also 
forgotten that the Aichi Biodiversity Targets4 are more ambitious; and that 
there are specific and closer targets for deforestation reduction from the 
remaining 7% to 9% of the Atlantic Forest, for example. 
An easy-to-do, but difficult to fulfill commitment in the current 
scenario, which suffered from a 16% increase in amazonian deforestation 
in 2014, in reference to the previous year. Commitment that meets the 
expectations of international (and national) actors on the contributions 
of”environmental power”. 
The Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC, in acronym 
in English)5 from Brazil6 is weak in terms of concrete actions to achieve 
reduction targets in the area of  land use, forest management and conservation 
and presents only generic proposals:
a) implement activities based on Reduction of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, considering the role 
of conservation of forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management and 
3 In a separate paradiplomatic action, the governments of Mato Grosso and Acre assume within COP21 
the commitment of zero illegal deforestation by the year 2020. http://www. mt. gov. br/-/governador-e-
ministra-assinam-declaracao-de-esforcos-conjuntos-para-desmatamento-zero. 
4 In the process of elaborating the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011-2020, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) proposed to establish a new set of targets, in the form of long-term 
objectives, which were embodied in 20 propositions, all aimed at reducing biodiversity loss worldwide. 
Called Aichi Biodiversity Targets, they are organized into five major strategic objectives: addressing 
the root causes of biodiversity loss, making biodiversity concerns permeate government and society; 
reduce direct pressures on biodiversity and promote sustainable use; improve the biodiversity 
situation, protecting ecosystems, species and genetic diversity; increase the benefits of biodiversity 
and ecosystem services for all; and increase the implementation, through participatory planning, of 
knowledge management and training. 
5 The Intended National Determined Contributions (INDC), consists of the reduction contributions 
that countries intend to take on a voluntary basis since 2015 and mandatory from 2020 onward, when 
they will be invited to review them. ”As in the Doha Round, INDCs can be established by each Party 
according to freely defined criteria. As the Center for Climate and Energy Solutions (2014) explains, 
the formation of INDCs is based on a bottom-up approach, according to which it is possible to use 
a wide range of parameters, such as: absolute targets for reducing emissions, or based on intensity-
carbon or even per capita emissions ; broad goals economy or industry wide; goals that adopt different 
years as base - 1990, 2000 or trend projections; etc. “(REI, CUNHA, 2015, p. 22). 
6 BRAZIL. Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC ) To Achieve the Purpose of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Available at: http://www. itamaraty. gov. br/
images/ed_desenvsust/BRASIL-iNDC-portugues. pdf. 
Fernando Cardozo Fernandes Rei & Alcindo Fernandes Gonçalves & Luciano Pereira de Souza
87Veredas do Direito, Belo Horizonte,  v.14  n.29  p.81-99  Mai./Ago. de 2017
forest carbon stocks raise (REDD +), which still lacks development and 
sponsors;
b) reinforce and enforce the implementation of the Forest Code 
at the federal, state and local levels, without indicating the form;
c) expand sustainable management systems for the native forests 
through georeferencing and tracking systems applicable to the management 
of native forests in order to combat illegal and unsustainable practices. 
That is, nothing really concrete, planned and detailed, leaving 
many doubts and uncertainties. 
To make the Brazilian proposal even more fragile, on the eve 
of COP-21, Brazil was hit by a devastating accident of human, social and 
ecological dimensions never seen in the country’s history, which was the 
rupture of the Samarco mining dam in Mariana (MG). Accident that, along 
with the multiple responsibilities taken by the holders, administrators and 
controllers of the mining activity, calls into question, at the international 
level, the capacity and effective action of the State in controlling and 
supervising the activities that cause risks and impacts such as mining. 
Brazil, which has played a leading role in the first period of 
negotiations of the regime, seems to have lost its protagonist spot during 
the last years, being left out of the big decisions and articulations, due to 
the loss of priority of the environmental agenda in the Dilma government. 
An issue presented to the current government is concerned 
to its behavior in the regime from COP-22 on, especially if it is able to 
realize the promises and targets of emission reduction which Brazil has 
committed, and what will be the space for participation of subnational 
and local governments, as well as other relevant multilevel governance 
players, who can make a valuable contribution. 
 
2 THE GLOBAL CONTEXT AND THE FUTURE OF THE REGIME
 
The global context was not one of the most encouraging for the 
climate agenda, which still runs the risk of cooling down completely (while 
global temperatures will continue to increase) before COP-21. On top of 
the agenda were the fight against terror triggered by the attacks in Paris 
and the USA, and, in general, the priority remained international security, 
with attention focused on Syria, Iraq and Islamic State, as well as other 
endemic aggressions. The priorities were followed by the humanitarian 
crisis of refugees from Africa, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, and economic 
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issues, such as the sharp drop in oil prices, slowing international trade, 
and diplomatic tensions in relations between Russia and Western countries 
regarding the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union and US, 
due to Russian interference in the Ukrainian crisis. 
Thus, it was plausible to consider that the priorities order of the 
international agenda did not favor the environmental demands. In fact, the 
UN Security Council is far from being the appropriate forum to deal with 
environmental issue, since it places its hopes on the environmental regimes 
and governance adopted by them, but not on the adoption of coercive 
measures, which will certainly empty the international environmental 
regimes. According to More (201?), 
 
The treatment of the environmental issue under the auspices of the principle of 
collective international security adopted in the Charter of the United Nations gives 
the subject known as ecological security, the status of international law of universal 
recognition, whose existence and coercive measures are subject to jurisdiction under 
the UN Security Council. 
 
But the international climate change regime has stunned, persisted 
and resisted. In terms of performance - as observed by the noted regime 
scholar Young (2010) - the regime needed to be unlocked, if it wished 
to advance with the necessary agility to adopt the inevitable decisions 
about the future of post-industrial civilization in the anthropocene. And 
it should be noted that the then broad multilateral negotiating model in 
the Framework Convention had not advanced in the pace and proportion 
needed to halt anthropogenic global warming (GONÇALVES, 2015). 
In addition, defensive attitudes of the constituting Countries 
hindered advances that could bring onus to the respective states, especially 
those related to eventual decrease of economic activity to reach GHG 
reduction targets, as Gonçalves (2015) points out. 
Other factors also explained the failure of the Framework 
Convention’s multilateral negotiating model, such as the need for 
consensus to deliberate, the formation of fragile and unstable agreements, 
the submission of vague and generic documents, the lack of sanctions in 
the treaties and the possibility of free-riders7 who take advantage of other 
people’s efforts, as well as the old and ever present background divergence 
between developed and developing countries (GONÇALVES, 2015). 
7  Author’s translation
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In this sense, the adoption of strategies complementary to the 
multilateral negotiations (GONÇALVES, 2015, pp. 15-16) has come to 
good use: a) use of the”bottom-up”8 which consists of encouraging countries 
to reflect and elaborate their proposals in the face of their own realities, to 
move towards the definition of global goals; b) conducting negotiations in 
blocs (bilateral or plurilateral) to achieve understanding faster with fewer 
participants, and c) strengthening processes and mechanisms involving 
global civil society in the negotiations. It is not a question of denying the 
multilateralism that underlies the current regime, but of proposing new, 
complementary ways of making decisions at a global level. And it was 
fortunately how it turned out. 
The international legal framework for climate change is legally 
structured by four documents, the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (approved at Rio/92, which entered into force in 
1994), the Kyoto Protocol (approved in 1997, which came into force in 
2005 and closed its first emission reduction period in 2012), the Doha 
Protocol Amendment (approved in 2013), which established new reduction 
commitments for developed countries for the second period of the Protocol, 
but did not came into force yet, and the Paris Agreement (approved in 2015 
at COP-21 and enforced in 2016), as stated by Rei and Cunha (2015). 
Concerning to the organizational design of the regime to combat 
climate change, it is formed by the following thematic axes: a) mitigation of 
climate change; b) adaptation to climate change; c) financing, technology 
and training; d) transparency; e) economic instruments and f) periodic 
review. 
For an overview of these organizational arrangements, their 
mandates and their interconnections, and the progress of work under the 
Framework Convention, it is important to note the summary prepared by the 
Secretariat of the Convention at the request of the ad hoc Working Group 
of the Durban Platform, established in 2011 with the task of developing 
a protocol, legal instrument or agreement that binds all parties under the 
Framework Convention until 2015, to be adopted at the 21st Conference of 
the Parties and that this protocol or legal agreement may be implemented 
from 2020 onward, which actually happened. 
Some arrangements are found in the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, which point to multilevel governance with 
the participation of subnational and non-state actors. It should be noted that 
8 Author’s translation
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the Paris Agreement expressly recognizes “the importance of commitment 
of all government levels as well as other different actors, in accordance 
with their respective national legislations of the Parties, in the fight against 
climate change” (preamble). 
Although it is not legally possible to establish international 
agreements with social groups (indigenous people, forest people), third 
sector organizations and economic agents, it is possible to establish political 
commitments, such as the New York Declaration on Forests signed in 
2014, on occasion of the United Nations Climate Summit. 
Regarding the efficiency of the climate regime, one of the major 
challenges is to form a global social consensus on the risks of climate 
change (global warming, extreme weather events, acidification of the 
oceans, rising sea levels) as quickly as possible. 
Hoffman’s (2015) work on the cultural issue behind the climate 
change debate shows the american people’s split on the theme as well as the 
polarization of the issue within the political scene between conservatives 
and democrats, and provides elements that explain very well why the 
US did not adhere to the Kyoto Protocol and remain one step behind in 
the Convention. Notwithstanding all the expectations generated by the 
commitments made by the Obama administration, the scenario seen in 
the Trump government seems to confirm the debate brought by Hoffman 
(2015). 
Hoffman (2015) demonstrates that it is not enough to build the 
scientific consensus on the issue, even though the IPCC is the technical-
scientific substrate of the regime, since it is also necessary to build a social 
consensus about the need to adopt the measures related to the stabilization 
of the global temperature and that these measures go through the realization 
of certain efforts and acceptance of some sacrifices. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve followers only with 
discourse while people still regard the issue of climate change as something 
abstract or distant future; And it seems that we will have to wait for 
humanity and global governance actors at every level to “feel in their pocket 
and skin” the effects of climate change to build a minimum consensus 
that strengthens the cognitive element of the regime, fundamental to its 
effectiveness. 
In this sense, it is necessary to “seize” (as opportunities) the 
extreme climatic events that happen in relation to global climate changes, 
in order to demonstrate to mankind what it can find in the near future if it 
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is not aware of the problem and the need to adopt mitigation, adaptation 
and other relevant measures to address climate change and anthropogenic 
global warming. 
The relative success of the COP-21 around a new binding 
instrument ends up being fundamental not only for the future of the regime 
but for life on the Planet and human civilization. However, the celebration 
of the instrument, its entry into force, in a scenario that brings the climate 
issue to the political agenda of governments, is not at all significant in 
terms of the outcome of the regime. A new Agreement in the regime should 
encourage institutional rearrangements, which has not yet been seen at 
COP-22 in Marrakech, although this was basically the main demand of the 
2016 Conference. 
There are some of the regime’s own challenges that must be 
tackled urgently, such as deciding on the use of sanctions for countries 
that do not meet their reduction targets or their obligations under the legal 
regime, in addition to national communications, monitoring, technology 
transfer and capacity building, financing and transparency of action. 
 
2. 1 Routing of responsibility sharing
 
Another relevant challenging aspect, as we have already seen, 
lies in the implementation and application of the (abstract) principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities. As a Principle developed 
within the International Environmental Law, common but differentiated 
responsibility carries within itself an unparalleled force of conviction which 
is the definitive and irreversible expression of its historical, philosophical, 
scientific, and juridical assertion. 
Anywhere on Earth that emits a gram of GHG impacts on the 
whole atmosphere being (over) charged with increasing concentration of 
those gases; And it is also known that the effects of the changes will not 
be defined according to the place where the emissions took place, nor will 
these effects be restricted to certain places (RUIZ, 2012). 
This lack of causal determinism in the global climate system, 
especially in the face of the globalization phenomenon, breaks with all 
the traditional solutions that law, as a technique of decidibility of conflicts 
can offer: the traditional civil liability scheme and its like, based on the 
paradigm of causal link is absolutely inoperative in the face of climate 
change; totally inconceivable is the idea that it is possible to exercise some 
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kind of Sovereign Power over the quality, composition, and movement of 
the atmospheric air from the air column above the physical territory of a 
state (Ruiz, 2012). 
However, as stated above, recognition of the principle of common 
but differentiated responsibility is not enough. It must be concretized, 
drawn from the heights of abstraction, and brought into the real sociol-
political realm of its historical and social application. 
Sharing, State to State, people to people, nation to nation, economy 
to economy, vulnerability to vulnerability, technology to technology, this 
common responsibility will perhaps be the greatest challenge in the history 
of mankind to date. 
And routing, the solution of this partition, it seems, is not 
within the reach of an international tribunal or a supra-state body, nor in a 
sovereign, polarized and conservative power struggle, much less in the use 
of military force. 
 
2. 2 Governance practice
 
If there is any way in this solution, it starts from the assumption 
of the vulnerabilities and challenges that can only be achieved through 
governance, as a technique and process for democratic (with multilevel 
participation), self-regulatory (provided that it is effective and more than 
just soft law), institutional (but not locked or tied as it is) and reflective 
(managing climatic risks in a plastic and dynamic) of this common and 
urgent problem of humanity. 
Only governance can point to the concrete measure and real 
dimension of responsibility (and sacrifice) of each unit (State) in this 
astronomically complex totality. 
One possible path is seen when the Convention innovates in 
the development of GHG emission reduction targets and, unlike the 
Kyoto logic, calls on the parties to indicate their reduction commitments 
(INDCs), and these self-appointed commitments become mandatory and 
can be pressed by others involved, not only with sanctions, but with the 
possibility of actions and interventions, following a bottom-up strategy. 
After all, as Dubois and Morosini (2016, p. 197) point out, “the 
consolidation of compliance control and sanctioning of noncompliance 
are generally analyzed as factors that lead to improved effectiveness” of 
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regimes. 
But that is not enough. It is an excerpt from a long way since the 
individual commitments of each State, while tallying, does not guarantee 
that it will achieve the required emission levels for climate stabilization in 
the two above pre-industrial levels. 
A next step in such a scenario would be to define criteria for 
cuts and this should be done in an additional painting to the Framework 
Convention, through governance so that all countries “contribute 
proportionately fairly” enough to stabilize the system climate change. 
The tools available would be negotiation, dialogue, transparency 
of action, cooperation (training, financing, transfer of technology), among 
others more compatible with the practice of governance. And the other 
important point about the regime is its functional plasticity and adaptability. 
On the basis of the precautionary principle, there is ongoing 
evaluation and review and building consensus among countries on the 
combined use of climate change coping strategies, namely: a) territorial 
planning for adaptation to climate change (the use of soil in coastal regions, 
installation of new developments in these regions, such as shipyards, 
among others), among other adaptation measures; b) de-carbonization of 
the economy, the creation of “green jobs” as well as cuts in GHG emissions 
in the various sectors; c) the development and use of technology such 
as geoengineering, without any of these coping strategies being simply 
discarded. They must, on the contrary, be integrated and produce synergy, 
so that the combined use of these strategies produces more effects in facing 
climate change than their isolated use, leading to efficiency gains. 
Even if the Framework Convention succeeds in achieving its 
ultimate goal of stabilizing the climate system around a level of GHG 
emission and a reasonably safe and tolerable global temperature increase, 
it must be noted that the climate change regime may not be sufficient to 
prevent the possible occurrence of catastrophic or even systemic events 
from a realignment or new equilibrium state of the biosphere. 
 
2. 3 The planetary boundaries
 
This idea is compatible with the view proposed by Rockström 
et al. (2009), about the so-called planetary boundaries, which, when 
overcome, could jeopardize the ecological balance at the planetary level: 
If one boundary is transgressed, then other boundaries are also under 
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serious risk. (p. 474)9
According to Viola and Franchini (2012), the notion of planetary 
boundaries appears as a new way of approaching sustainability, not in the 
same isolated and localized way as the classical environmental approach, 
but in a global, systemic way. 
The planetary boundaries correspond to certain limits represented 
by physical factors of the environment (such as the pH of the oceans, 
the concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere), or appear as limits of use, 
exploitation or degradation of environmental resources and goods within 
which human civilization could operate safely, without jeopardizing the 
planetary ecological balance. 
These boundaries are formed by nine boundaries which, when 
exceeded, could jeopardize the environmental stability maintained 
during the last geological period prior to the Industrial Revolution, and 
consequently displace the balance of the global system (biosphere), which 
could lead to harmful or even catastrophic consequences In various parts 
of the globe10. 
In the words of Viola and Franchini (2012, p. 2): 
 
[...] nine planetary boundaries are identified, seven11 of which can be quantified: 
climate change; acidification of the oceans; ozone; biogeochemical nitrogen and 
phosphorus cycle; fresh water use; changes in land use; biodiversity; chemical 
pollution; and concentration of aerosols in the atmosphere. Three of these nine 
planetary frontiers have already been overcome: climate change, biodiversity loss 
rate and nitrogen cycle. 
 
As can be seen, together with the increase in heat resulting 
from the balance between the solar radiation that enters the planet and the 
energy that the planet releases in space, the concentration of GHG in the 
atmosphere, due to the anthropogenic releases since the pre-industrial era, 
would already have exceeded the levels considered safe for the maintenance 
9 If one of the planetary boundary is surpassed, then the other boundaries are in serious risk. (Author’s 
translation)
10 Transcribed from the considerations of the scientists who proposed the idea of  planetary boundaries 
(PB): [...] Since the Industrial Revolution, a new era has arisen, the Anthropocene [note4], in 
which human actions have become the main driver of global environmental change. This could see 
human activities push the Earth system outside the stable environmental state of the Holocene, with 
consequences that are detrimental or even catastrophic for large parts of the world [...]”(2009, p. 474). 
11 At present, eight of the nine planetary boundaries (PB) have been quantified, leaving only the 
quantification of the insertion of new biological entities.
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of the stability of the global climatic system. 
Similarly, the loss of biodiversity, quantified by the extinction 
rate of species per million existing species, may already be putting at 
risk the resilience of ecosystems, ie their ability to recover and remain 
structurally and functionally balanced, In the face of external pressures, 
such as the action of man. 
The removal of molecular nitrogen from the atmosphere, to be 
used by man, quantified in millions of tons per year removed from the 
atmosphere, has already far exceeded the annual limit considered safe 
(ROCKSTRÖM et al., 2009, p. 473/4). 
In addition to these three global boundaries, there is news that 
a fourth planetary frontier has already been crossed, the one regarding 
to changes in land (STEFFEN et al., 2015). Thus, the percentage of the 
original land cover converted to man’s use (crop) would have already 
surpassed the 15% prudential limit of the original coverage. 
By adopting the approach of the planetary boundaries within 
which humanity could operate safely, formed by nine frontiers whose 
planetary support capacities, when overcome, may jeopardize the stability 
and balance of the global system (biosphere), we must begin to think of 
one governance mechanism that integrates regimes, capable of articulating 
them. 
Global environmental governance (although still deficient) 
is seen as the most appropriate tool to address the common problems 
of humanity, especially the ones regarding to environment, but it is 
understood that governance, in order to act effectively, needs the breaking 
of conservative paradigms (VIOLA; FRANCHINNI, 2012), as well as a 
minimum of order and stability, that is, a set of conditions and institutions 
that are incompatible with a return to global barbarism, an armed conflict, 
or absolutely unilateral positions of arrogance and intolerance. 
 
CONCLUSION
 
The advancement of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change since the entry into force of the Paris Agreement is a 
fact and, given the recognition that the planetary climate boundary has 
already been surpassed and mankind no longer operates in a safe space in 
relation to the stability of the climate system, it is essential that it generate 
results. 
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The efforts throughout the almost 25 years of negotiations under 
the international regime on the complex distribution of the common but 
differentiated responsibilities that each country has in the effort to mitigate 
emissions have had inefficient results to date which can not be despised. 
The expectation generated by the newly open stage on the world agenda 
since 2016 is not unaware that the decisions taken are still insufficient to 
guarantee the goal of climate stabilization, but they demonstrate the vitality 
of a complex process of multilateral negotiation, which already presented 
discouraging signs. 
In view of the interconnected planetary boundary approach, it is 
necessary to emphasize that it is not enough to overcome the challenges of 
celebrating the achievements and then implementing a global agreement 
to reduce GHG emissions, without also promoting effective governance 
in combating desertification, deforestation/forest degradation, conversion 
of natural vegetation cover, loss of biodiversity and ocean acidification, 
reduction of atmospheric nitrogen removal, excessive consumption of 
water resources, chemical pollution and the release of aerosols into the 
atmosphere. 
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